Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future. Two judges also concluded that, to the extent appellants challenged the Attorney General's preclearance decisions, their claim was foreclosed by this Court's holding in Morris v. Gressette, 432 U. S. 491 (1977). Our focus is on appellants' claim that the State engaged in unconstitutional racial gerrymandering. Redistricters have to justify themselves. A covered jurisdiction's interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to comply with the nonretrogression rule under 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not give it carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. Classifying citizens by race, as we have said, threatens spe-. 808 F. Supp. This Court's subsequent reliance on Gomillion in other Fourteenth Amendment cases suggests the correctness of Justice Whittaker's view. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). This small sample only begins to scratch the surface of the problems raised by the majority's test. The Court offers them no explanation of this paradox. All citizens may register, vote, and be represented. Shaw v. Reno. The "historic and present condition" of the Mexican-American community, id., at 767, a status of cultural and economic marginality, id., at 768, as well as the legislature's unresponsiveness to the group's interests, id., at 768-769, justified the conclusion that MexicanAmericans were "'effectively removed from the political processes,'" and "invidiously excluded from effective participation in political life," id., at 769. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. facilitating the election of a member of an identifiable group of voters? The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. Again, in White v. Regester, supra, the same criteria were used to uphold the District Court's finding that a redistricting plan was unconstitutional. There is a characteristic coincidence of disadvantageous effect and illegitimate purpose associated with the State's use of race in those situations in which it has immediately trig-. I believe that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when the State creates the kind of uncouth district boundaries seen inKarcher v. Daggett(1983),Gomillion v. Lightfoot)(1960), and this case, for the sole purpose of making it more difficult for members of a minority group to win an election. Pp. to Juris. Although the statute that redrew the city limits of Tuskegee was race neutral on its face, plaintiffs alleged that its effect was impermissibly to remove from the city virtually all black voters and no white voters. Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. After population gains tracked by the 1990 census, North Carolina was able to get a 12 th Congressional seat for the state. I doubt that this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court's equal protection cases-i. ); see also post, at 662-663 (opinion of WHITE, J.). Shaw appealed. Given two districts drawn on similar, race-based grounds, the one does not become more injurious than the other simply by virtue of being snakelike, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned and absent any evidence of differential racial impact. 10 This appears to be what has occurred in this instance. The three-judge District Court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the federal appellees. Docket no. Reno. 16-19. On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Thomas G. Hungar, and Jessica Dunsay Silver. This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 118-127. For example, on remand North Carolina might claim that it adopted the revised plan in order to comply with the 5 "nonretrogression" principle. of Elections, 393 U. S. 544, 569 (1969) (emphasis added). 9 The Court says its new cause of action is justified by what I understand to be some ingredients of stigmatic harm, see ante, at 647-648, and by a "threa[t] to our system of representative democracy," ante, at 650, both caused by the mere adoption of a districting plan with the elements I have described in the text, supra, at 685. See supra, at 642-643. It reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their constituency as a whole. Putting that to one side, it seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina's creation of this strangely shaped majority-minority district "generates" within the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferi-. See post, at 678 (dissenting opinion). After the General Assembly passed legislation creating the second district, a group of white voters in North Carolina, led by Ruth O. Shaw, sued on the grounds that the district was an unconstitutional gerrymander . Finally, the highly fractured decision in UJO does not foreclose the claim recognized here, which is analytically distinct from the vote-dilution claim made there. Location North Carolina General Assembly. Two others concluded that the statute did not minimize or cancel out a minority group's voting strength and that the State's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted by the Department of Justice, "foreclose[d] any finding that [the State] acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters." They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.(1977). Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. to Brief for Federal Appellees lOa. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915), the Court invalidated under the Fifteenth Amendment a statute that imposed a literacy requirement on voters but contained a "grandfather clause" applicable to individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote "on [or prior to] January 1, 1866." Cf. These lawmakers are quite aware that the districts they create will have a white or a black majority; and with each new district comes the unavoidable choice as to the racial composition of the district." In other words, the "analytically distinct claim" the majority discovers today was in plain view and did not carry the day for petitioners. Id., at 53-54. of Gal. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. Cf. 392, 397 (WDNC 1992). They were the first blacks to represent North Carolina, a state with a 20 percent black population, since 1901. John Paul . No. "Being aware," in this context, is shorthand for "taking into account," and it hardly can be doubted that legislators routinely engage in the business of making electoral predictions based on group characteristics-racial, ethnic, and the like. In their complaint, appellants did not claim that the General Assembly's reapportionment plan unconstitutionally "diluted" white voting strength. JOHN H. MERRILL, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. tutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Supp., at 466-467; id., at 474 (Voorhees, C. J., concurring. own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system." Thus, for example, awarding government contracts on a racial basis excludes certain firms from competition on racial grounds. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society . " Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 555. How do you think the civil rights movement and federal laws led to changes in American society and politics? See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S. 448,524-525, n. 3 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("No person in [UJOJ was deprived of his electoral franchise"); Regents of Univ. The grounds for my disagreement with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have not presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable injury. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellants have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Equal Protection Clause. 2 See Karcher, 462 U. S., at 748 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ("If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment-whether racial, ethnic, religious, economic, or political-that may occupy a position of strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak segment of, duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. 657-658. Did North Carolina residents claim that the 1990 redistricting plan discriminated on the basis of race raise a valid constitutional issue under the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? We have indicated that similar preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. -constitution prohibits using race as the main reason for how to draw districts. Finally, we must ask whether otherwise permissible redistricting to benefit an underrepresented minority group becomes impermissible when the minority group is defined by its race. I respectfully dissent. Thus, if appellants' allegations of a racial gerrymander are not contradicted on remand, the District Court must determine whether the General Assembly's reapportionment plan satisfies strict scrutiny. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. The state appellees assert that the deliberate creation of majority-minority districts is the most precise way-indeed the only effective way-to overcome the effects of racially polarized voting. 42 U. S. C. 1973(b). Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. Justice Frankfurter characterized the complaint as alleging a deprivation of the right to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects. )-forecloses the claim we recognize today. For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. The purposes of favoring minority voters and complying with the Voting Rights Act are not discriminatory in the constitutional sense, the court reasoned, and majority-minority districts have an impermissibly discriminatory effect only when they unfairly dilute or cancel out white voting strength. Supp., at 472-473. Accordingly, we have asked that an identifiable group demonstrate more than mere lack of success at the polls to make out a successful gerrymandering claim. It is currently at its target debtequity ratio of .60. The Court reasoned: "If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote." Such districting might have both the intent and effect of "packing" members of the group so as to deprive them of any influence in other districts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that the Appellants, Shaw and others (Appellants), have a legitimate claim that North Carolina's redistricting scheme was so irregular on its face that it could only be viewed as an effort to segregate races for the purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting or What? taker's concurrence appears to be premised on the notion that black citizens were being "fenc[ed] out" of municipal benefits. See ante, at 666-667, and n. 6 (dissenting opinion). Appellants point out that blacks currently hold the positions of State Auditor, Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and chair of the North Carolina State Board of Elections. The Court characterizes the decision as "highly fractured," ante, at 651, but that should not detract attention from the rejection by a majority in UJO of the claim that the State's intentional creation of majority-minority districts transgressed constitutional norms. Seeing no good reason to engage in either, I dissent. The Attorney General's interposition of a 5 objection "properly is viewed" as "an administrative finding of discrimination" against a racial minority. b. ); post, at 684, and n. 6 (opinion of SOUTER, J. But the State must have a "'strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action [is] necessary.'" But even recast as a Fourteenth Amendment case, Gomillion does not assist the majority, for its focus was on the alleged effect of the city's action, which was to exclude black voters from the municipality of Tuskegee. 15, 1. Summary: Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case argued on April 20, 1993. When a newly created district cannot be explained by means other than race, it is subject to strict scrutiny. 461, 476 (EDNC 1992) (Voorhees, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and a "bug splattered on a windshield," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1992, p. A14. Appellants stated an equal protection claim by alleging that North Carolina's reapportionment scheme was so irrational on its face that it could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters based on race, and that separation lacks sufficient justification. The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. App. 1973. or benefit provided to others.4 All citizens may register, vote, and be represented. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493-495 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ.) Id., at 342-348. In 1982, it amended 2 of the Voting Rights Act to prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a minority group's voting strength, regardless of the legislature's intent. The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 86-90, and nn. Our different approaches to equal protection in electoral districting and nondistricting cases reflect these differences. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of racebased state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. The plaintiffs in UJO-members of a Hasidic community split between two districts under New York's revised redistricting plan-did not allege that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as an effort to segregate voters by race. What I am saying is that in electoral districting there frequently are permissible uses of race, such as its use to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as well as impermissible ones. See Richmond v. J. See App. See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. US attorney general rejected a North Carolina congressional reappointment plan because the plan created only one black majority district, 1. u. S. 735, 753 (1973); see also Mobile v. Bolden, supra, at 86-87 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote dilution. 1 "Bloc racial voting is an unfortunate phenomenon, but we are repeatedly faced with the findings of knowledgeable district courts that it is a fact of life. 8The black plaintiffs in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), I am confident, would have suffered equally had whites in Tuskegee sought to maintain their control by annexing predominantly white suburbs, rather than splitting the municipality in two. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. The majority-minority district that is at the center of the controversy is, according to the State, 54.71% Mrican-American. In fact, our country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting-as well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for discrimination on the basis of race, see supra, at 642-644-would seem to compel the opposite conclusion. We also do not decide whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, surely, does not stand in the way. UJO, supra, at 151-152. Racial gerrymanders come in various shades: At-large voting schemes, see, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); the fragmentation of a minority group among various districts "so that it is a majority in none," Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S. 146, 153 (1993), otherwise known as "cracking," cf. 8While the Court "express[es] no view as to whether 'the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more,' always gives rise to an equal protection claim," ante, at 649 (quoting ante, at 668 (WHITE, J., dissenting)), it repeatedly emphasizes that there is some reason to believe that a configuration devised with reference to traditional districting principles would present a case falling outside the cause of action recognized today. The central explanation has to do with the nature of the redistricting process. Rather, the issue is whether the classification based on race discriminates. To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan. Supp., at 467. The Court held that although North Carolina's reapportionment plan was racially neutral on its face, the resulting district shape was bizarre enough to suggest that it constituted an effort to separate voters into different districts based on race. No.1, 458 U. S. 457, 485 (1982). 653-657. Syllabus ; View Case ; Appellant Shaw . Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids districting plans that will have a discriminatory effect on minority groups. Accord, Wygant, 476 U. S., at 273 (plurality opinion). Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"Arlington Heights, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. U. S. See ante, at 642-643. That claim was dismissed, see Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. Chief Judge Voorhees agreed that race-conscious redistricting is not per se unconstitutional but dissented from the rest of the majority's equal protection analysis. This problem continues the Draper Consulting situation from previous problems. 430 U. S., at 167-168 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ.). JUSTICE SOUTER does not adequately explain why these harms are not cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons stated by JUSTICE WHITE, the decision of the District Court should be affirmed. Centered in the northeast portion of the State, it moves southward until it tapers to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reaches far into the southernmost part of the State near the South Carolina border. Written and curated by real attorneys at Quimbee. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. It deemed appellants' claim under the Fifteenth Amendment essentially subsumed within their related claim under the Equal Protection Clause. See ante, at 647. JUSTICE SOUTER'S reasoning is flawed. Why did four justices in this case dissent from majority opinion? If a reapportionment plan creates a district that is so irregular that the only reason for its creation is to separate voters based on race, then an Equal Protection challenge against that plan is valid. In other words, the purposeful creation of a majority-minority district could have discriminatory effect if it is achieved by means of "packing"-i. e., overconcentration of minority voters. The Court offers no adequate justification for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently from other districting claims. Lacking support in any of the Court's precedents, the majority's novel type of claim also makes no sense. They alleged that the General Assembly deliberately "create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily-without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions" with the purpose "to create Congressional Districts along racial lines" and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress. Of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor subsumed within their claim! Similar preconditions apply in 2 challenges to single-member districts Court today answers this question in the way,! Any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our system of representative democracy nondistricting cases these... Necessary. ' seat for the State must have a discriminatory effect on minority groups 's choice of... 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